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Introduction
Alfred Kroeber’s “The Superorganic” is a classic of anthropological theory. Originally 
published in 1917 in American Anthropologist, the article drew important responses from 
Edward Sapir and Alexander Goldenweiser. SMOP #1 includes Kroeber’s article. This 
occasional paper includes Sapir and Goldenweiser’s responses. The responses have been edited 
for brevity, concision, and clarity. In a few cases I have altered verbs and nouns for agreement 
when editing the text caused them to disagree. These are indicated with brackets. The goal has 
been to respect the author’s stylistic choices while presenting a slimmed-down version which can 
be taught in a single session in an undergraduate or graduate theory course.
I hope that this paper, like the others in this series, will help present early anthropological 
theory in a form that is accessible to everyone. There is today a tremendous amount of material 
which is open access, but is difficult to find, inconvenient to read, and many people do not know 
where to start. By curating a selection of important open access work, I hope to make open 
access resources better known and to raise awareness of the actual history of anthropological 
theory.
Alexander Goldenweiser earned his Ph.D. from Boas in 1910, with a Ph.D. on totemism. 
Goldenweiser was the most philosophical of the Boasians, and is best remembered for his 
theoretical work. His response to Kroeber reflects this theoretical outlook. He engages with 
Kroeber on two main issues: the nature of civilizational determinism, and the role of the 
individual in influencing culture.
First, Goldenweiser argues that Kroeber is committed to ‘civilizational determinism’, that idea 
that the actions of individuals are shaped by their civilization, or culture. It is true, said 
Goldenweiser, that all civilizations are determined, in the sense that everything in the universe 
has a cause. But if we decide to focus on the history of a single civilization, then we our analysis 
will necessarily overlook a variety of factors which we have chosen not to study, and yet which 
still shape the action of individuals and the development of civilizations. There is nothing wrong 
with choosing an analytic emphasis -- everyone does it -- but we should not, Goldenweiser 
argues, assume that because we are only studying one kind of cause, one kind of cause must be at 
work in any given situation. Goldenweiser was preoccpied with this dilemma: as anthropologists, 
we must focus on only part of reality, since reality is too complex for us to understand or study it 
all. And yet at the same time, the events that we study will always be affected by causes which 
we have chosen to ignore. How to avoid this paradox became a major part of Goldenweiser’s 
thought.
This concern with the impossibly rich nature of reality also manifests itself in Goldenweiser’s 
second issue with Kroeber, regarding the nature of the individual. Individuals are not merely the 
products of their civilization, they are ‘concrete’ and ‘historical’. Their lives have been shaped by 
the unique set of factors at play in the historical moment in which they lived. When an individual 
makes an innovation, they thus inevitably inject some of their particularity into the civilizational 
stream. It cannot be, then, that culture is immune to influences from other sorts of causal forces. 
Goldenweiser ends on an interesting note: perhaps anthropologists believe individuals lack 
agency because we lack rich accounts of individual human lives in ‘primitive’ societies. As we 
are never in a position to see the full influence extraordinary people can have on the cultures we 
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study. Goldenweiser was one of the few anthropologists who made a point of publishing 
obituaries of his key informants in American Anthropologist. Although early anthropologists are 
often portrayed as being almost hyperbolically racially insensitive, It is worth pointing out that as 
early as 1917, Goldenweiser thought it important to recognize the full humanity of the people he 
encountered during his fieldwork.
Edward Sapir is one of the best-known Boasians and the man responsible for spearheading 
linguistic anthropology as a subdiscipline. Sapir shares Goldenweiser’s insistence on individual 
agency, and both agree that social facts can have non-social causes. Sapir’s response is 
particularly interesting because he explicitly elaborates a position that Goldenweiser implicitly 
drew on. For Kroeber, anthropology is a distinct discipline because it has a unique object: the 
superorganic. Sapir, on the other hand, believes that anthropology is a distinct discipline because 
it has a distinct outlook: a concern with particularlity.
Following Boas, as well as other thinkers such as Heinrich Rickert and (perhaps) Ernst Mach, 
Sapir argues that the superorganic is an abstraction, not an actually existing thing. The world is 
an infinitely complex place, and the terms anthropologists use to discuss it are simplifications 
which we use to make sense of it. Thus anthropology cannot have a unique object of study, 
because the object of study is constructed by the anthropologist when they choose how to 
approach reality -- there is a ‘principle of selection’ involved in filtering reality. Because the 
object of science is the result of the cognitive accomplishment of the researcher -- it is selected 
for study out of the infinity of things one can study -- then civilization cannot be a ‘real thing’ out 
there in the world which we experience. It is, rather, an abstraction that we create. For this reason 
the superorganic cannot be a real thing with its own principles of causality.
The different between biology and anthropology, Sapir argues, lies not in the object they study 
but the viewpoint they bring to the table. In the case of anthropology, that viewpoint is a concern 
with particularity, and so anthropologists are only interested in general laws of human culture 
because they help us understand particular cultures. Biologists, on the other hand, are interested 
in general laws pertaining to life, and are interested in particular species only because of the light 
they may shed on those general laws. In practice, Sapir emphasizes, all healthy disciplines have 
both generalizing and particularizing moments and the difference between them is a matter of 
emphasis.
In the 1960s and 1970s anthropologists would spend a great deal of time discussing the role of 
‘models’ in social science. It is interesting to see that in this very early debate, Sapir and 
Goldenweiser hold an orthodox Boasian line against Kroeber’s realism, a line which seems 
remarkably prescient of theoretical debates that would occur half a century later.
-R
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The Autonomy of the Social
By Alexander Goldenweiser
In a stimulating disquisition on “The Superorganic” Dr. Kroeber returns to the topic he has 
made peculiarly his own. With the major, critical, destructive part of the essay I must express 
unequivocal agreement. But my agreement with Dr. Kroeber stops short of his formulation of the 
concept of historic autonomy. Dr. Kroeber voices his belief in cultural or civilizational 
determinism. Here we must call for a more precise determination of the group which is being 
considered. Is it the civilization of the world at large? If that were the case, then there would be 
truth in the proposition: What is must be, in the sense of having a cause. Unless we are prepared 
to admit that one or another part of the cosmic whole may suddenly run amuck and play havoc 
with law and order, such a universal determinism must be accepted as a conceptual necessity, 
with reference to civilization, or anything else.
But with reference to any particular civilization the deterministic creed breaks down. An 
invention being a function of knowledge and effort, when the requisite state of knowledge is 
reached and a number of minds are concentrating on a certain problem, the probability of the 
invention or discovery being is high, and if the number of minds is large, the probability will 
approach certainty. On the other hand, the same invention may be made at a time when the 
probability of that event is very low, owing to the presence of an exceptional mind or through 
importation from another civilization. An invention thus made may have the same or greater 
historic consequences than would be the case in the alternative instance. Now in this the events 
may not be regarded as civilizationally or socially predetermined; with reference to the culture of 
the group they are accidental. The theory of probability breaks down here, the individual event 
alone counts: and it may make the difference, for all time, between a high and a low civilization.
My second point of difference with Dr. Kroeber refers to the relation of a civilization to the 
chain of individuals who are its carriers. I grant that the civilizational stream may be considered 
as a closed system and can be stud[ied] as such. Dr. Kroeber, in his turn, grants that useful 
knowledge, even about the stream of civilization, may be gleaned from a study of its component 
individuals. But this is not going far enough. The civilizational stream is not merely carried but is 
also unrelentingly fed by its component individuals. The term “individual,” in this context, 
requires specification. It is not the biological individual, nor is it the abstract being of general 
psychology, nor is it this or that more or less gifted individual. The individual who counts here 
may be designated as the biographical individual. He is a historic complex sui generis. Neither 
biological nor psychological, nor civilizational factors exhaust his content. He has partaken of 
the culture of his social environment, but only of certain aspects of it, and these have come to 
him in a certain individual order, at certain definite places and times, and have been received and 
absorbed by a psyche that was unique. This is the concrete individual of historic society. He is 
unique and as such he reacts on the civilization of which he is the carrier. Leave him out, and a 
blind spot appears in the record of civilization. I am convinced that not along the objective study 
of civilization lies that "path of merely but deeply understanding phenomena," to which the 
author refers at another place. The inferiority of our knowledge of Kwakiutl or Yoruba 
civilization when compared to our knowledge of the civilization of France or Germany is in part 
due to the inferiority of the civilizational record; but it is also due, perhaps more significantly, to 
the vast inferiority of the biographical record. This is the crying need the modern ethnologist 
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tries to supply: and to the extent to which he is successful, our knowledge of primitive 
civilization becomes more deep.
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Do We Need A “Superorganic”?
By Edward Sapir
Nothing irritates a student of culture more than to have the methods of the exact sciences 
flaunted in his face as a salutary antidote to his own supposedly slipshod methods. It is such 
irritation that seems to have served as the emotional impetus of Dr. Kroeber’s discussion of ‘The 
Superorganic.” Many anthropologists will sympathize with him and rejoice that he has squarely 
taken up the cudgel for a rigidly historical and anti-biological interpretation of culture. There is 
little in Dr. Kroeber’s general standpoint and specific statements that I should be disposed to 
quarrel with. Yet I feel that on two points he has allowed himself to go further than he is 
warranted in going.
In the first place, I believe that Dr. Kroeber greatly overshoots the mark in his complete 
elimination of the influence of individuals on the course of history. All individuals impress 
themselves on their social environment and to make their individuality count in the direction 
taken by the never-ceasing flux that the form and content of social activity are inevitably subject 
to. It is always the individual that really thinks and acts and dreams and revolts. Those of his 
thoughts, acts, dreams, and rebellions that somehow contribute to the modification or retention of 
culture we term social data; the rest, though they do not in the least differ from these, we term 
individual and pass by as of no historical or social moment. It is highly important to note that the 
differentiation of these two types of reaction is essentially arbitrary, resting, as it does, entirely 
on a principle of selection. The threshold of the social (or historical) versus the individual shifts 
according to the philosophy of the evaluator or interpreter. I find it utterly inconceivable to draw 
a sharp and eternally valid dividing line between them. Clearly, then, “individual” reactions 
constantly spill over into and lend color to “social” reactions.
Under these circumstances how is it possible for the social to escape the impress of at least 
certain individualities? It seems to me that it requires a social determinism amounting to a 
religion to deny to individuals all directive power, all culture-moulding influence. Dr. Kroeber 
chooses his examples from the realm of inventions and scientific theories. Here it is relatively 
easy to justify a sweeping social determinism in view of a certain general inevitability in the 
course of the acquirement of knowledge. This inevitability does not altogether reside, as Dr. 
Kroeber seems to imply, in a social “force” but in the fixity, conceptually speaking, of the 
objective world. This fixity forms the sharpest of predetermined grooves for the unfolding of 
man’s knowledge. 
Had he occupied himself with the religious, philosophic, aesthetic, and crudely volitional 
activities and tendencies of man, I believe that Dr. Kroeber’s case for the non-cultural 
significance of the individual would have been far more difficult to make. Many a momentous 
cultural development, particularly in the religious and aesthetic spheres, is a partial function of 
the temperamental peculiarities of a significant personality. As the social units grow larger and 
larger, the probabilities of the occurrence of striking and influential personalities grow vastly. 
Hence it is that the determining influence of individuals is more easily demonstrated in the 
higher than in the lower levels of culture. One has only to think seriously of what such 
personalities as Shakespeare mean in the history of culture to commit oneself to a non-
individualistic interpretation of history. I do not believe for a moment that such personalities are 
merely the cat’s-paws of general cultural drifts. If such an interpretation of the significance of the 
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individual introduces ‘a repugnant element of “accident” into the history of culture, so much the 
worse for the social scientists who fear accident.
The second point in Dr. Kroeber’s essay that I take exception to concerns his interpretation of 
the nature of social phenomena. He predicates a social “force” whose gradual unfolding is 
manifested in history. The social is builded out of the organic, but is not entirely resolvable into 
it. It implies the presence of an unknown principle which transcends the organic, just as the 
organic, while similarly builded out of the inorganic, is not resolvable into it. I consider the 
analogy a false one. Moreover, I do not believe that Dr. Kroeber has rightly seized upon the true 
nature of the opposition between history and non-historical science.
The analogy is a false one because the social is merely a philosophically arbitrary selection 
out of the total mass of phenomena ideally resolvable into inorganic, organic, arid psychic 
processes. The social is but a name for those reactions that depend for their perpetuation on a 
cumulative technique of transference known as social inheritance. This technique, however, 
involves no new force, merely a refinement and complication of an earlier force or of earlier 
forces. The differential characteristic of social science lies thus entirely in a modulus of values, 
not in an accession of irresolvably distinct subject matter. Between the psychic and the social 
there is no chasm in the above sense at all. The break lies entirely in the principle of selection 
that respectively animates the two groups of sciences. Social science is not psychology, not 
because it studies the resultants of a superorganic force, but because its terms are differently 
demarcated.
It is quite true that the phenomena of social science, as claimed by Dr. Kroeber, are 
irresolvable into the terms of psychology or organic science, but this irresolvability is an 
existential one. This type of irresolvability is toto caelo distinct from that which separates the 
psychic and the organic or the organic and the inorganic, where we are confronted by true 
conceptual incommensurables.
What I mean by “experiential irresolvability” I shall illustrate by an example from a totally 
different science. Few sciences are so clearly defined as regards scope as geology. It would 
ordinarily be classed as a natural science. It does entirely without the concepts of the social, 
psychic, or organic. It is a science of purely inorganic subject matter. As such it is conceptually 
resolvable into the more fundamental sciences of physics and chemistry. But no amount of 
conceptual synthesis of the phenomena we call chemical or physical would enable us to construct 
a science of geology. This science depends for its raison d’etre on a series of unique experiences 
about the earth. The basis of the science is, then, firmly grounded in the uniqueness of particular 
events. To be precise, geology looks in two directions. In so far as it occupies itself with abstract 
masses and forces, it is a conceptual science. In so far as it deals with a particular mountain 
chain, and aims to reconstruct the probable history of such features, it is not a conceptual science 
at all. In methodology, it is actually a species of history, only the history moves entirely in the 
inorganic sphere. In practice, of course, geology is a mixed type of science, now primarily 
conceptual, now primarily descriptive.  Between the data of the latter aspect and the concepts of 
the former lies that yawning abyss that must forever, in the very nature of things, divorce the real 
world of directly experienced phenomena from the ideal world of conceptual science.
The leap from psychology to social science is just of this nature. Any social datum is 
resolvable, theoretically, into psychological concepts. But just as little as the most accurate and 
complete mastery of physics and chemistry enables us to synthesize a science of geology, does 
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an equivalent mastery of the conceptual science of psychology -- which, by the way, nobody 
possesses -- enable us to synthesize the actual nature and development of social institutions or 
other historical data. These must be directly experienced and selected from the endless mass of 
human phenomena according to a principle of values. Historical science thus differs from natural 
science in its adherence to the real world of phenomena, not, like the latter, to the simplified and 
abstract world of ideal concepts. It strives to value the unique or individual, not the universal.
Are not, then, such concepts as a clan comparable in lack of individual connotation to the 
ideal concepts of natural science? Are not the laws applicable to these historical concepts as 
conceptually valid as those of natural science? Logically it is difficult to make a distinction, as 
the same mental processes of observation, classification, and so on, are brought into play. 
Philosophically, however the two types of concepts are utterly distinct. Social concepts are 
convenient summaries of a strictly limited range of phenomena, each element of which has real 
value. Relatively to the concept “clan” a particular clan of a specific Indian tribe has undeniable 
value as an historical entity. Relatively to the concept “crystal” a particular ruby in the jeweler’s 
shop has no relevancy except by way of illustration. Were all crystals existent at this moment 
suddenly disintegrated, the science of crystallography would still be valid. Were all clans now 
existent annihilated, it is highly debatable whether the science of sociology would have 
prognostic value. 
Consider negative instances. If, out of one hundred clans, ninety-nine obeyed a certain 
sociological “law,” we would justly flatter ourselves with having made a particularly neat and 
sweeping generalization; our ‘‘law” would have validity, even if we never succeeded in 
“explaining” the one exception. But if, out of one million selected experiments intended to test a 
physical law 999,999 corroborated the law and one persistently refused to do so. After all 
disturbing factors had been eliminated, we would be driven to seek a new formulation of our law. 
There is something deeper involved here than relative accuracy. The social “law” is an 
abbreviation for a finite number of evaluated phenomena, and rarely more than an approximately 
accurate formula at that; the natural “law” is a universally valid formulation of a regular 
sequence observable in an indefinitely large number of phenomena selected at random. With the 
multiplication of instances social “laws” become more and more blurred in outline, natural 
“laws” more and more rigid.
I strongly suspect that Dr. Kroeber will not find me to differ essentially from him in my 
conception of history. What I should like to emphasize, however, is that it is perfectly possible to 
hold this view of history without invoking the aid of a “superorganic.” Moreover, had the 
uniqueness of historical phenomena been as consistently clear to him as he himself would 
require, it would be difficult to understand why he should have insisted on eliminating the 
individual in the narrow sense of the word.
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